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The complexities of Phase II QR regimes lead to the need for the distinction
between nominal and effective exchange rates and for careful estimation of.
Definitions those rates. If there were no QRs, however, one would simply obtain estimates
of EER changes, and then proceed in the same manner as in the case where
devaluation occurred from an initial situation characterized by full conver- Some definition
tibility on current account and a unified exchange rate. Analysis would be Liberalization ai
relatively unaffected. Chapter 5. It wi
In fact the prior existence of QRs significantly affects the way in which domestic handlii
in the absence devaluation itself affects economic behavior. Moreover, many devaluation
packages have included measures to alter the QR regime directly. It is the pur- premium accruii
pose of this chapter to examine the ways in which the prior existence of QRs modity. It is con
and alterations in the QR regime affect the impact of the Phase III policy the foreign curr
package. commodity (alti
A first task is to explore the interaction of devaluation and the QR cost one dollar).
regime. Thereafter, the experience of the ten countries in the twenty-two Phase Thus, the p
III episodes can be reviewed. For this purpose it is convenient to use the PRm,,, can be ex
categorization of regime attributes outlined in Chapter 4. The extent of the
III liberalization, changes in bias, rationalization, and reduced variance
in incentives is discussed for each of the twenty-two episodes.
where p,, is the
I. INTERACTION OF DEVALUATION AND THE QR REGIME: price of i at tim
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS effective exchani
importation of
The traditional analysis of devaluation proceeds in terms of defining the con- domestic currenc
ditions under which devaluation will reduce an open deficit that is excessive or the nominal exci
86INTERACTION OF DEVALUATION 87
increase a surplus that is too small. It is thus built around the important insight
that the excess of domestic expenditure over income must be reduced if the
reduction in an open deficit is to be achieved by an expenditure-switching
policy such as devaluation. Part of a net devaluation may be aimed at offset-
ting an existing or anticipated deficit; that portion may be analyzed in the same
way as the devaluation of any convertible currency. Virtually all the factors
relevant to consideration of devaluation of a convertible currency apply as well
when a country employing exchange control undergoes a real devaluation to
reduce the size of its ex-ante deficit. Those factors are considered in Chapter 7.
Here, focus is on the ways exchange rate changes interact with the QR
regime. Initially the relationship between deficit reduction, bias, liberalization,
and devaluation can be dealt with in the context of a two-commodity model.
Variance reduction and rationalization are, by their nature, phenomena that
assume importance only with additional commodities (or differential treat-
ment of the same commodity according to size of firm, location, or other at-
tributes).
Definitions
Some definitions pertaining to QR-related aspects of Phase III are in order.
Liberalization and bias reduction can be defined using the terms introduced in
Chapter 5. It will be recalled that the domestic price of a commodity (net of
domestic handling charges) would be equal to its EER times the foreign price
in the absenceQRs. With QRs, the difference between the two is the
premium accruing to the recipient of a license to import one unit of the com-
modity. It is convenient, however, to compute premiums accruing per unit of
the foreign currency value of the import license rather than per unit of the
commodity (although one can always choose units of each commodity that
cost one dollar).
Thus, the premium on an import license for the ith commodity at time t,
PR,n,,, can be expressed as:
where isthe domestic price of commodity 1 at time q;is the foreign
price of iattime t; E,isthe current nominal exchange rate; and EER1,is the
effective exchange rate for i at time t. If there is no quantitative restriction on
importation of i,theratio of the domestic price to the foreign price (in
domestic currency at the nominal exchange rate) equals the ratio of the EER to
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(t) were the only protective device, then p,, =(1+ t1jq1,E, and EER1, =(1
+ In this case, would be zero.
A QR regime is said to be more restrictivethehigher is the value of
premiums as a percentage of the value of trade. Conversely, a regime is more
liberalized the smaller is the value of premiums as a percentage of the value of
trade.2 It should be noted that there is no particular reason why premiums
should accrue only to imports; it is perfectly possible for a trade and payments
regime to permit only limited quantities of exports. In such cases, export
licenses would be valuable for their holders because the foreign price of expor-
tables would be higher than the domestic price by more than the EER differen-
tial.3 In practice, premiums have been quantitatively much more significant
for import licenses than for exports.
From the definition given in Equation (6.1), it is immediately apparent
that liberalization can take place: (1) if more imports are allowed at the
prevailing EERs; (2) if the EER is raised with a given number of licenses
issued; (3) if domestic demand decreases (with an implied fall in the domestic
price with a given foreign price and EER); and (4) if the foreign price of the
commodity increases autonomously. The foreign price might change, but it is
not a policy instrument that can be undertaken by the government of a
developing country. The first three mechanisms can be used to liberalize the
regime by deliberate policy. Combinations of the three alternatives are also
possible and, indeed, much of the discussion of alternative policy packages for
shifting from reliance on QRs to reliance on pricing will entail consideration of
the extent to which each of the three means should be employed.
Another effect of devaluation and QR alteration can be a change in bias.
The bias (B) of the regime, at time t, may be defined as:
B,=(1+t,+n,+PRm,)/(1+r,+s,) (6.2)
where (from Chapter 5) n, =thevalue of import surcharges; r, =thevalue
of export encouragement schemes, and s, =thesubsidy (or tax) per dollar of
exports.4 All other terms are as defined in (6.1). The measure B, indicates the
ratio of import substitution prices to export prices domestically relative to the
same ratio internationally.5 A higher B, implies a greater incentive for
domestic production of import substitutes. Ideal resource allocation oc-
curs—assuming the absence of monopoly power in trade and of domestic
distortions—when B =1.6Bias can be in either direction: when B is less than
unity, a trade and payments regime is said to be biased toward export promo-
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Relationship between Bias and Liberalization
Inspection of the definitions of bias and liberalization shows that there is no
necessary reason, at least in theory, for a connection between the two. A
regime could be fully liberalized and yet employ exceedingly high tariffs in
order to encourage import substitution. The regime would then be liberalized
and highly biased. Alternatively, a QR regime could subject both exports and
imports to severe licensing but carry the same premium rate on the two ac-
tivities. In that case the regime would be highly restrictive, but not biased.'
Turning the argument around, there are obviously trade-offs between
alternative ways of altering bias as well as of liberalizing. One could maintain a
constant degree of bias, while liberalizing, if QRs were replaced with their
tariff equivalents; conversely, the degree of bias could be increased, while
maintaining a constant degree of liberalization, by raising tariffs or reducing
export subsidies and incentives.
The Effects of Devaluation under QRs
An alteration in the exchange rate affects every aspect of QRs and their impact
on economic activity. Although the altered variance and rationalization that
may result from an exchange rate change must be analyzed in a multi-
commodity context, most other effects can be understood readily in a two-
commodity model.
Figure 6-1 is designed to show the relationship between devaluation,
deficit reduction, liberalization, and bias. Panel A shows how the exchange
rate alteration is partitioned into the replacement component and net devalua-
tion. In Panel B the net devaluation is divided into the portion which corrects
an open deficit and that which affects the bias and restrictiveness of QRs. The
relationship between liberalization and bias reduction resulting from that por-
tion of the net devaluation which does not correct the deficit can be seen in
Panel C. Because the geometry is useful only on the two-commodity case, the
relationship of devaluation and QRs to rationalization and reduced variance
of the regime cannot be illustrated.9
Panel A portrays the initial situation and the exchange rate change. The
line DD represents the quantity of foreign exchange that would be purchased
(to buy imports) at each price of foreign exchange. The diagram is partial
equilibrium in that the behavior of the domestic money supply, of aggregate
expenditure, and of related variables is not specified. If world prices are
assumed given to the country, the line DD can be interpreted as the volume of
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Figure 6-1.Components of Devaluation
outcomeof both production and consumption decisions—as the domestic
price of importables rises, individuals presumably reduce their consumption of
those commodities, while domestic production increases.'0
The SS line has a comparable interpretation: it represents the quantity of





Panel CINTERACTION OF DEVALUATION 91
foreign exchange. As with demand decisions the quantity of exports (at given
international prices) reflects changes in both domestic production and con-
sumption that would occur as the domestic price varied (relative to some ag-
gregate of "other" commodities, usually thought of as home goods).
Suppose, now, that in the initial situation the price of foreign exchange is
p0,butthat there is an export subsidy in the amount (makingtheEER
for exports), and a tariff on imports in the amount p,,p,,(makingp.,. the EER
for imports). If individuals were free to undertake all the transactions they
wished at those prices, imports would be od in value (and in volume, given the
constant foreign price assumption), while exports would be oa; the deficit
would be equal to the difference, ad. Suppose, however, that such a deficit is
unacceptable, so that imports are limited, by quantitative restrictions, to the
ab levelob, with a resulting small deficit of ab. The domestic price of imports is
thenPd,andthe premium on import licenses is PmPd.Thebias of the regime is
Exchange Pd/Px, reflectingthe difference between the domestic incentive to produce im-
andfor portsubstitutes and exports relative to the international marginal rate of
change transformation."
Assume now that there is a devaluation from p°top,,,andthat the export
subsidy and import duty are simultaneously removed. The net devaluation is
thus p.,,p,,forimports, and p,p,,forexports (a composite EER change could be
derived by weighting the two separate EER changes). Suppose, further, that it
is intended that there be no deficit after devaluation. In that case Panel B can
be used to determine the amount of net devaluation necessary for removing the
deficit. The EE curve in Panel B is derived from Panel A: it represents the ex-
cess demand for foreign exchange that would arise at various 'prices of foreign
exchange in the absence of tariffs and export subsidies. The horizontal axis
now measures the deficit that would occur at each price of foreign exchange in
the absence of surcharges and quotas.If p.,is taken as the weighted
predevaluation EER, then the distance ba on the horizontal axis, traced to the
vertical axis, may be used to calculate the change in the price of foreign ex-
change that would result in a reduction in the deficit in the amount of ab. If
net devaluation were equal in amount only to (andignoring the com-
plications that arise because of differential changes in import and export
EERs), then the restrictiveness of the QR system would be unaltered because
exports would increase or imports fall by enough to wipe out the deficit.'2
The effect of the exchange rate alteration on bias and liberalization can be
easily seen from Panel C. Exports, at the new export EER, would be oc
and—under the assumption that the deficit is eliminated—imports would be of
as the domestic the same value. The domestic price of imports would fall from andthe
consumption of premium on import licenses would decline from topip.,.Thatdecline
represents a decrease in the restrictiveness of the regime; that is, it constitutes
s the quantity of liberalization. It, and the increase in the export EER, both contribute to reduc-
at each price of tion in bias, which falls from toph/p.,.Itshould be noted that liberaliza-92 QR-RELATED ASPECTS OF PHASE II
tion could occur even without exchange rate alteration by increasing the im-
port duty from PPm to any higher level; bias in the regime could be unaltered,
but the regime completely liberalized, if the import duty were increased to
Conversely, bias could be eliminated at the old exchange rate and the
restrictiveness of the regime unaltered, if exports were subsidized in the
amoUnt (although there would be a large trade surplus), while imports
were held to their original level.
The partial-equilibrium defects of Figure 6-1 should be apparent from the
discussion. The figure nonetheless helps to show that liberalization and bias
reduction can both come about as a result of net devaluation and even from
deficit reduction, depending on the nature of the difference between net and
gross devaluation. One could, in principle, have a liberalizing devaluation with
bias unchanged, or a bias/reducing devaluation with the extent of liberalization
unaltered. The latter, however, is hardly likely, except in the case where the
major portion of the devaluation results in deficit elimination.
In general, reduction in the premium on import licenses is likely to affect
both the degree of restrictiveness of the regime and the bias of the regime.
Likewise, increasing the export EER will directly reduce the bias of the regime,
and—to the extent that export earnings increase and permit an increased flow
of imports—the import premium will likely fall. Devaluation, therefore, is
likely to affect both bias and restrictiveness. Bias is likely to decline, both
because the premium on import licenses is likely to fall and even more impor-
tantly because the export EER is likely to increase by proportionately more
than the domestic price of importables. Liberalization is likely to occur as the
premium on import (or export) licenses is replaced by pricing measures. It is
therefore important to recognize, not only the distinction between net and
gross devaluation, but also the impact of devaluation on bias and on the
restrictiveness of the regime.
It is well known that economic analysis is straightforward whenever there
is a single relative price, as in the two-commodity case, and that it becomes ex-
tremely complex whenever there are many commodities. That is true of the
analysis of tariffs, as is evidenced by the great difficulty of analyzing the
welfare implications of lowering a particular tariff in a tariff-ridden world. It
is equally true of the various complications that are introduced by the fact that
QR regimes normally discriminate in a variety of ways among commodity
categories so that the divergence between domestic and international marginal
rates of transformation varies widely among different classes of transactions.
An important hypothesis that is frequently encountered is that QR
regimes inevitably generate greater variance of this type than their tariff-
equivalent counterparts and that this variance may be a major cost of using
QRs rather than tariffs. Unlike the relationship between devaluation and bias





































-jLIBERALIZATION DURING PHASE III 93
should be subject to greater variance than tariff-ridden liberalized regimes.
However, as the following discussion indicates, the country studies provide
considerable empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis.
II. LIBERALIZATION DURING PHASE Ill EPISODES
Liberalization results from devaluation itself because the premium on import
(and export) licenses is partially or totally absorbed by the exchange rate
change. In addition, other policies can be adopted to liberalize the regime.
These include imposing tariffs to replace QRs, permitting increased quantities
of imports, and also depressing the level of economic activity in order to
reduce the demand for imports.'3
In the twenty-two Phase III episodes, varying degrees of emphasis were
placed on liberalization, and the means of achieving it differed from case to
case. Brazil (1957), Ghana (1966/67), India (1966), Israel (1952 and 1962), the
Philippines (1960), South Korea (1964) and Turkey (1958) are all instances
where liberalization was an important component of the devaluation
packages. A short description of the salient features of each will demonstrate
the wide variety and diversity of ways by which devaluation and changes in QR
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For Brazil the 1957 Phase III was accompanied by the introduction of a tariff
system that replaced an earlier auction system. Under the new system a set
quantity of imports in a particular category was permitted, and the licenses
were auctioned off. Fishlow, in his summary, saw the 1957 Phase III as but
one step in a progression "from a crude system of direct licenses in 1957 to a
highly sophisticated commercial policy seeking to stimulate exports and
regulate import demand in a progressively more open
14Later
Brazilian Phase Ills were to complete the transition. The 1961 episode seems to
have had its greatest impact in reducing the variance in differentials among
commodity categories. The 1964 Phase III, which really had two stages,
centered on bias reduction.
In the first stage, from 1964 to 1967, imports were liberalized by a variety
of means, which also cut bias toward import substitutes. In the second stage,
1967/68, bias was shifted markedly toward exports, a trend that continued
over the next several years.Both the 1961 and 1964 devaluations were follow-
ed by increased reliance upon tariffs and pricing interventions. Quantitative
restrictions had vanished by the late 1960s.94 QR-RELATED ASPECTS OF PHASE 1!
Ghana, 1966/67
In Ghana the QR system in effect prior to the 1967 devaluation relied heavily
on specific licensing, under which each import license application was in-
dividually considered.'6 An open General Import License (OGL) was available
only for books and periodicals and nonmerchandise articles in1961.17
Thereafter, until the devaluation,specific licensing remained the rule,
although commodities were sporadically added to, or deleted from, the eligible
OGL list. With the in 1967, there was a shift toward more liberal
licensing policies. As reported by Leith:
Importliberalizationbeganalmostimmediatelyafterthedevaluation
and continued an uneven but uninterrupted expansion through the next
four and one-half years. The attempt was cautious.Expansion of the
OGL list was spread over several years. ...Aslicenses were removed
from substantial portions of the import bill, surcharges on delicensed im-
ports were introduced.Initiallythenthe import liberalization appeared
tobe designedtosubstitutepriceforquantitativerestrictionof im-
ports. ...Inthe latter stages of the liberalization, however,itbecame
apparent that the objective was to increase the level of imports—an ob-
jectivefar more difficult to sustain in the absence of continued export
growth. ..."
Evenin the initial devaluation announcement, emphasis was placed on the ob-
jective of moving toward open general licensing and away from specific licens-
ing of all imports." Leith stresses that the initial intent—to dismantle the QR
system and replace it with pricing measures—was frustrated only when the
shift to pricing measures was accompanied by an endeavor to increase the level
of imports. At that stage, balance-of-payments pressures again emerged. The
reasons why liberalization could not be sustained, which are analyzed in detail
by Leith, concern primarily the macroeconomic policy conducted by the
government of Ghana during the liberalization effort.
For present purposes, what is worth noting is that Ghana did achieve con-
siderable liberalization: whereas OGL imports constituted only 3 percent of
Ghanaian imports in 1967, they rose to 59 percent of imports in the latter half
of 1970. By that time all the various techniques indicated, above had been used
to liberalize the regime. The government had adopted deflationary monetary
and fiscal policies a year prior to the devaluation, thereby reducing the de-
mand for imports. The devaluation itself absorbed some of the preexisting
premiums on import licenses, and the special charges on imports mentioned by
Leith also helped absorb premiums. Finally, in the later part of the liberaliza-
tion effort the government permitted a sizable current account deficit in order
to maintain the flow of imports.
India, 1966
Some liberalizat
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India, 1966
Some liberalization had already started in India prior to the 1966 devaluation.
It had taken the form of removing or relaxing industrial licensing requirements
which, as Bhagwati and Srinivasan show, had interacted with import licensing
in a number of ways to intensify the restrictive effect of each. Bhagwati and
Srinivasan see the 1966 Phase III episode as a continuation of the momentum
that resulted from the earlier halting moves toward industrial delicensing. One
of the components of the devaluation package, as originally announced, was
"an official declaration and implementation of a policy of liberalized import
licensing."20 This policy was implemented by the introduction of 59 "priority
industries," whose import licensing requests were to be treated on a far
simpler basis than had earlier been the case. Import licenses for intermediate
goods and raw material inputs not domestically produced were to be issued
automatically for six-month periods, in an amount not exceeding that used in
the preceding six months.
While this "liberalization" fell far short of a liberalized trade and
payments regime, it represented a significant relaxation of the stringent condi-
tions that had surrounced any import license request prior to the devaluation.
In the months following devaluation, premiums fell significantly. For drugs
and medicines, for example, premium rates ranged from 185 to 245 percent in
January to April 1966 and ranged from 38 to 62 percent in the July to
December period. A simple average of the premium rates for January and
February was 226 percent, compared with a comparable average of 81 percent
for September and October, after the devaluation.21
In the Indian case, the foreign exchange shortage was so severe at the time
of devaluation that the alteration in the exchange rate alone did not begin to
absorb the premium on import licenses—the import EER increased only 40
percent from 1965 to 1966. The additional imports for priority industries could
not have been permitted had not measures been taken to supplement the
devaluation. The major means of increasing the flow of imports was borrow-
ing from abroad at the time of devaluation, chiefly through credits from a con-
sortium of aid donors. In addition, a recession contributed to reduced import
demand.22
Israel, 1952 and 1962
The Israeli devaluations of 1952 and 1962 were both aimed at reducing reliance
upon QRs. Israel had used QRs almost exclusively for regulating the balance
of payments during the 1949-1951 period. The 1952 devaluation was aimed at
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goods—was simply eliminated, and remaining QRs were intended to protect
domestic industry.
Whereas the 1952 devaluation was accompanied by the abandonment of
QRs for purposes of controlling the balance of payments, the 1962 devaluation
was aimed at shifting from QRs to tariffs for protective purposes. As explain-
ed by Michaely:
Removal of the QRs proved to be easy, and was performed quite rapidly, for im-
ports of raw materials and semimanufactured intermediate goods [inthe
1952-1955 Phase Ill episode]. Since these were not produced in Israel, and could
not potentially be produced within a relevant price range, liberalization of such
imports did not effectively reduce protection to any local industrial branch.
In fact, total protection of import substitutes by QRs remained in force some
seven or eight years after the restoration of balance-of-payments equilibrium.
Only with the second New Economic Policy, in 1962, did the progressive relaxa-
tion of these restrictions start. Even then, for some seven years the change was
primarily in the formofprotection: quantitative restrictions were replaced by the
price mechanism, that is, by appropriate tariffs designed to grant each industry

















For the liberalization that started in 1962, the Israeli government established a
commission that received evidence and recommended tariff levels and the
removal of quantitative restrictions. Liberalization was a gradual process,
which took several years to effect. This delay occurred despite the fact that
"by the early 1960's most policymakers were convinced that the protection
system led to a substantial misallocation of the country's resources and would
have to undergo a radical transformation."24
The liberalization was, however, successful, in that QRs were eventually
completely removed. The two Israeli devaluations point up an interesting con-
trast. The first, which resulted in the freeing of raw materials and intermediate
goods imports, in fact increased the effective protection given by QRs to
domestic industry and was easily accomplished. The second, which tended to
lower effective protection, was by far the more difficult and required a great
deal more time to accomplish. The resistance to shifting from QRs to tariffs
encountered in Israel is one of a number of pieces of evidence suggesting that
QRs may have a significantly greater protective effect than policymakers in-
tend.
The Philippines, 1960-1962
The purpose of the1960 Philippine devaluation was to eliminate reliance on






















96LIBERALIZATION DURING PHASE III 97
nded toprotect protective purposes. Thus, it was hoped that this devaluation would ac-
complish what it took both Israeli devaluations to achieve. At the outset of the
bandoriment of Phase III episode, multiple exchange rates were introduced. From that time
962 devaluation until January 1962 the particular exchange rate categories at which individual
ses. As explain- commodities could be traded were periodically shifted so that gradually more
commodities were traded at higher EERs, and the lowest EERs were abandon-
ed. Concurrently the exchange control regulations which had previously ap-
ipidly, for im- plied to all transactions were gradually relaxed, and some categories of tran-
;oods(in the sactions were exempted. Finally, in January 1962, full exchange decontrol was
ad, and could decreed. However, there was a replacement of those controls with pricing
zation of such measures.
I branch. ... ThePhilippine case thus represents an instance where liberalization was
in force some effected primarily by substituting price measures for QRs. It is interesting in
s equilibrium, that the intent was to liberalize without affecting the bias of the regime.





In the 1961 devaluation in South Korea, there was an attempt to liberalize the nt established a
levels and the regime: import controls were revised and grouped into four classes, ranging
from commodities for which requests for licenses would be automatically adual process, granted (automatic approvals) to prohibited commodities. However, with the te the fact that reemergence of balance-of-payments pressures in 1963, the trend was reversed, the protection and commodities were shifted away from the automatic approval (AA) list. rces and would The AA list was expanded again after the Phase III reforms Wlate 1964. This
shifting of commodities among exchange control categories is apparent in the were eventually data provided in Table 6-1. interesting con- In the South Korean case the exchange-rate adjustment was the major intermediate
means by which liberalization was accomplished. That adjustment was accom- yen by QRs to
vhich tended to panied by a very rapid growth of exports,25 and liberalization could thus be
sustained and increased without resort to additional surcharges on imports or equired a great deflation in the domestic economy. QRs to tariffs
suggesting that
olicymakers in- Turkey, 1958
The Turkish 1958 Phase III started from a situation in which foreign exchange
was so scarce that import licensing had virtually halted. Import license applica-
tions were accepted or rejected on a specific basis, and the rejection rate was
high. The situation was so chaotic that on many occasions the receipt of an im-
Late reliance port license did not assure that the would-be importer would be able to pur-




Period Approval Restricted Restricted ImportableProhibited
Firsthalf 1961 1,546a 35b — i,ssi 305
Second half 1961 1,015 17 — 1,132 355
Firsthalf 1962 1,195 119 — 1,314 366
Secondhalf 1962 1,377 121 — 1,498 433
Firsthalf 1963 776 713 — 1,489 442
Second half 1963 109 924 — 1,033 414
First half 1964 n.a. n.a. na. 1,124 617
Second half 1964 na. na. n.a. 496 631
Firsthalf 1965 1,447 92 19 1,558 624
Secondhalf 1965 1,495 12 4 1,623 620
Firsthalf 1966 2,104 125 11 2,240 583
Second half 1966 2,307 127 12 2,446 386
First half 1967 2,950 132 — 3,082 362
Source: Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 45.
alncludes 309 special items that could be imported only when financed by export earnings.
blndicates import items linked to specific exports.
to develuation partly to keep domestic prices low by regulating exports and
partly to try to insure that export earnings would flow through official chan-
nels.
A major part of the devaluation package consisted of dismantling the ex-
port controls and liberalizing imports. An import regime was introduced under
which three lists of commodities would be announced every six months. These
lists were liberalized imports, for which import licenses would presumably be
automatically granted; quota imports, for which a given total amount of
foreign exchange was made available, subject to strict procedures for alloca-
tion among applicants; and bilateral imports, which could originate from
countries having bilateral trading agreements with Turkey. Any commodity
not listed could not be imported.
The Turkish government had to borrow extensively in order to increase
imports under the new regime. Imports rose from $247 million in 1958 to $354
million in 1959. The increased flow of imports, combined with an increaase in
the import EER in excess of 100 percent, virtually eliminated the premium on
import licenses. Although monetary and fiscal policies were restrictive, real
GNP rose about 5 percent in the year following devaluation. The 1958 Turkish
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In all the cases cited above, liberalization was achieved to a significant extent,
2 355
at least in the immediate postdevaluation period. To be sure, it was seldom
4 366
8 433 complete, and occasionally—as in India—the regime was probably more
9 442 restrictionist after devaluation than many others—such as South Korea—were
3 414 prior to devaluation.
The other Phase III episodes, by and large, were accompanied by some 24 617
liberalization. In general, however, liberalization was less prominent as a part 631
ofthe devaluation package than in the cases cited above. The Chilean devalua- 58 624
23 620 tionS, for example, all entailed some liberalization through the exchange rate
10 583 changes and also through increased import flows. However, all three Chilean
16 386 episodes were marked by erosion of the exchange rate change by the domestic
82 362 rate of inflation, and such liberalization as there was was short-lived. In Chile,
as to a lesser extent in Colombia, the liberalization component of the devalua-
tion was reduced because devaluation was generally undertaken in the midst of
a severe balance-of-payments crisis. As such, much of the exchange rate xport earnings.
change was preventive: to keep the exchange control regime from becoming
more restrictionist.
The lesson that emerges from all the episodes is that devaluation—at least
•net devaluation—absorbs part of the premium on import licenses and thus ting exports and generally provides some liberalization of the regime even in the absence of gh official chan- other measures. In the short run there are numerous policy instruments that
can increase the extent of liberalization. They range all the way from replacing mantling the ex-
ntroduced under QRs with tariffs—as in Israel and the Philippines—to domestic deflation to
x months. These reduce import demand and to borrowing abroad to finance an increased im-
,d presumably be• port volume. In the long run, of course, liberalization can be continued only if
total amount of the pricing measures enable individuals to carry out their desired transactions,
dures for alloca- and generally that requires a sustained increase in foreign exchange earnings.
The distinction between the policies that permit continued liberalization in the
Ioriginate from
long run will be considered in subsequent chapters. Any commodity
order to increase
III. THE EXTENT OF BIAS REDUCTION n in 1958 to $354
han increaase in
the premium on There are two a priori reasons why one would expect a devaluation to reduce
the bias of the trade and payments regime. First, to the extent that the devalua- e restrictive, real
rhe 1958 Turkish tion absorbs premiums on import licenses, the domestic price of import-100 QR-RELATED ASPECTS OF PHASE II
competing commodities will not increase. The increased price of foreign ex- difficulty: obtai change will therefore be more fully reflected in the domestic price of expor- Yet, whatever ti
tables than in the domestic price of import-competing goods. That effect, by a premium-inch
definition, reduces bias. Second, devaluations are usually accompanied by the Ideally one removal of surcharges on imports and of subsidies on nontraditional exports. prices of export
Because the preexisting export subsidies are usually smaller than the sur- tariffs and othe
charges on imports, the effect is to make the net devaluation proportionately prices would yi4
larger for exports than for import-competing commodities, the import EER
There can, of course, be offsets: if QRs are simply replaced with tariffs, the trade and pa
as in some of the episodes reviewed above, the bias of the regime might be un- of importables,
changed. But even then the authorities deciding upon tariff levels would need charges), would
to take into account the higher postdevaluation domestic price of exportables; behavior over ti
in practice, that seldom happens. This section attempts to quantify the extent It is, howe
of bias reduction in the twenty-two Phase III episodes covered by the country gathering of su
studies and to generalize on the basis of that experience about the relationship EERs is itself a
between devaluation and bias reduction. some tariffs are
The bias of a regime relates to the extent to which domestic incentives for more difficult,
production of import-competing goods and of exports differ from the ideal providing more pattern—one in which the international marginal rate of transformation the exchange co
equals the domestic marginal rate of transformation among all pairs of corn- This analys
modities. In a two-commodity world, bias could be measured by estimating time-series data the tariff and the tariff-equivalent of other charges (including the protective that imperfectly equivalent of import prohibitions) on import goods that competed with periods surroun domestic production, and by adding that to the tariff-equivalent of the
premium on import licenses. The resulting estimate could then be contrasted
with a comparable estimate of subsidies, implicit and explicit, on exports.27 Time Series Vai
Inpractice there is usually considerable variation among the premium-
inclusive protective equivalents given to various categories of import-
ESTIMATES
competing commodities and also among export categories. The concept of
"bias," therefore, must be regarded as some sort of aggregate notion, subject Table 6-2 p
to the usual difficulties that arise when attempting to discuss aggregates: the bias and change
test is whether it is a meaningful aggregation. Much of the argument of the re- only five count
mainder of this volume, and especially of Part III, will center on differences premiums becat
between export-oriented and import-substitution development strategies and and for the Ph
trade regimes, that is, on the degree of bias. The test of usefulness is therefore -inclusive and
met for this purpose, although the reader is warned that systems with identical Brazilian, Chile
bias in the aggregate may have significantly different effects. Not only might Philippines,fri
that bias be achieved in one case with QRs and in another via tariffs and sub- premium-inclusi
sidies, but also there might be different levels of protection granted to dif- First, howe
ferent categories of commodities, nine episodes al
The fact that the notion of bias is an aggregate one creates analytical pro- generalize. How
blems, in that results which hold for the two-commodity case cannot necessari- tern. In most of
ly be generalized for n commodities. There is an even more serious empirical pine 1960 episocTHE EXTENT OF BIAS REDUCTION 101





r than the sur-
proportionatelY
ced with tariffs,
































difficulty: obtaining estimates of the height of premiums is extremely difficult.
Yet, whatever the analytical shortcomings, it is easily shown that failure to use
a premium-inclusive estimate of bias will yield meaningless results.28
Ideally one would like time-series data on the domestic and international
prices of exportables and comparable data for importables plus an estimate of
tariffs and other charges on imports. The ratios of domestic to international
prices would yield EERs for the various commodity categories. The ratio of
the import EER to the export EER would then provide a measure of the bias in
the trade and payments regime and its behavior over time. The domestic price
of importables, less the landed cost of importables (including tariffs and other
charges), would provide a measure of the premium on import licenses and its
behavior over time.
It is, however, the nature of QR regimes that virtually precludes the
gathering of such a set of data. Obtaining estimates of export and import
EERs is itself a time-consuming process, especially when it is recognized that
some tariffs are redundant.29 Estimating premiums on import licenses is even
more difficult, and only in five of the studies did country authors succeed in
providing more than a point-in-time estimate of the domestic prices evoked by
the exchange control regime.
This analysis will use two approaches to measuring bias: the available
time-series data will be examined and contrasted with potential proxy variables
that imperfectly reflect bias, and the experience of a few countries during the
periods surrounding their Phase III episodes will be examined.
Time Series Variables for Bias
ESTIMATES OF PROM THE COUNTRY STUDIES
Table 6-2 provides estimates from the country studies on the magnitude of
bias and changes in it surrounding devaluation episodes. Data are available for
only five countries; of those, the South Korean estimates do not include
premiums because QRs were not operative surrounding the two devaluations,
and for the Philippines in 1970, there is no difference between premium
-inclusive and premium-exclusive EERs. We are therefore left with the
Brazilian, Chilean, and Turkish data, as well as one observation from the
Philippines, from which any inferences about the difference between
premium-inclusive and premium-exclusive estimates of the bias can be drawn.
First, however, changes in bias themselves need close scrutiny. Even if the
nine episodes all showed the same pattern, it would be extremely difficult to
generalize. However, the data given in Table 6-2 do not reflect a uniform pat-
tern. In most of the cases, including the two Turkish devaluations, the Philip-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DTHE EXTENT OF BIAS REDUCTION 103
panied by a sharp reduction in bias. Even two years afterward, bias toward im-
portsubstitution was less than it had been before the Phase III episode. On the
other hand, the Brazilian 1957devaluationpresents a very different picture.
There, it will be recalled, QRs were replaced by tariffs. Fishlow's estimates in-
dicate that the bias of the regime was higher immediately after devaluation
than before. This came about because the export EER rose only 22 percent,
while the premium-inclusive import EER rose 44 percent as tariffs were in-
creasedsubstantially. Two years later, however, the bias of the regime was less
oriented toward import substitution than it had been before. The 1961 and
1964 Brazilian devaluations appear to have resulted in continued further
reductions in the bias of the regime, but by relatively small amounts. It was not
until 1967/68 that the regime favored exports. Other exceptions to the tenden-
cyfor devaluation to result in bias reduction are Chile's second and third
Phase III episodes, in which bias of the regime appears to have been virtually
unaffected.
Knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the Phase III episodes, corn-
bined with the data in Table 6-2, suggest the following hypothesis: when QRs
are severe before devaluation, and devaluation comes about because the
resulting "shortage" of imports appears too damaging to the domestic
economy, bias is almost certain to be reduced substantially. Such was the case
.8 inChile in 1956, in the Philippines in 1960, and in the two Turkish devalua-
tions. The data reported by Bhagwati and Srinivasan on premiums on imports
before and after devaluation in India, and their account of the situation, both
suggest that the bias of the regime must also have fallen sharply in India
following the 1966 devaluation.
Theconverse of the hypothesis stated above is that, when devaluation is
undertaken largely as a catch-up move, with domestic inflation rates quickly
eroding any change in real EERs, there is unlikely to be any significant or
lasting change in the bias of the regime as a result of devaluation. The Chilean
ç data for 1959 and 1965 seem to bear that out; the intent seems to have been
largelyto control domestic inflation, and the program turned out to be unsuc-
cessful. The proposition that bias is likely to be unaltered when the real ex-
change rate does not change significantly follows in part simply from theory.
Exports will not increase under such circumstances, and import demand is
likely to be as great as before; it must follow, therefore, that premiums on im-
port licenses will remain much as before.
The alteration in bias that accompanied South Korean devaluations is also
of interest. In South Korea, devaluation was accompanied by reduced bias
toward exports. The export-promotion strategy in that country was carried out
by sharply increasing the subsidies and incentives toward exports as the real ex-
changerate eroded between devaluations. So, when devaluation took place,
export subsidies were replaced by the exchange rate change. In the South104 QR-RELATEDASPECTS OF PHASE It
Korean case the policy orientation toward exports was reflected in the fact that
the subsidies and subsidy-equivalents of incentives to export were substantial.
Their removal meant that the net devaluation for exports was significantly
smaller than for imports, with the result that the bias of the regime toward ex-
ports lessened.
THE USEFULNESS OF PROXY VARIABLES
Given the difficulties involved in obtaining estimates of premium-
inclusive EERs, it is of some interest to examine the extent to which proxy
variables might adequately reflect the bias of the regime. There are two ob-
vious candidates for proxies: the ratio of the premium-exclusive import EER
to the export EER, and the ratio of the black market exchange rate to some
other exchange rate.
There is no a priorireasonwhy premium-exclusive rates should accurately
reflect bias. As indicated at the outset, however, net devaluation is usually
greater for the class of commodities that bias is against: import-competing
goods for South Korea and exportables for Turkey. In addition, changes in
bias are the result of changes in premiums and in EERs; it could be argued that
it is better to have data on one part of the change than no data at all. The dif-
ficulty with that argument, of course, is that the purposes of devaluations are
sufficiently different so that there are grounds for believing that premium-
absorption will not be systematically related to the differential change in ex-
port and import EERs. For the Israeli 1952-1955 devaluation, for example, it
is clear that the very much larger change in the import EER reflected the intent
of the authorities to absorb the premium; as already noted, the protection ac-
corded to Israeli industry actually increased.
Given that theory is of little help except to point out the pitfalls, it is in-
structive to examine the data. Table 6-3 presents estimates of the premium-
exclusive ratio of export and import EERs surrounding devaluation episodes
and also for two years afterward. For the countries for which premium-
inclusive estimates are available, those numbers are given in parentheses to
enable ready comparison of the two means of estimating changes in bias.
Two things stand out clearly. First, failure to include premiums can
significantly distort estimates of bias, as in Chile where the premium-exclusive
EERs are all in the range of 1.2, while the premium-inclusive EERs range
much closer to 2. Second, the amount of bias reduction will be understated in
those instances where liberalization is a major facet of the devaluation
episode.BeforethePhilippines1960-1962devaluation,forexample,
premiums on import licenses had been at least as important as tariffs in in-
creasing the incentive to produce import substitutes. Those premiums were,
according to Baldwin's estimates, wiped out by the devaluation that took place
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Egypt 1962 .98 1.01 1.01
Ghana 1967 1.83 1.78 1.93

































Note: Numbers in parentheses are premium-inclusive estimates of bias.
Sources: Same as for Table 5-1 for EER ratios and Table 6-2 for bias.
aEstjmate is for 1971.
significantly distorts the results. If only the data on Philippine premium-
exclusive EERs were inspected, bias reduction would seem to have been
remarkably small—from 1.64 to 1.36. If, however, the estimate of predevalua-
tion bias includes the premiums, the estimate of bias is changed to 2.01. The
same general phenomenon holds for Turkey, where a substantial portion of
the increase in the import EER went to virtually eliminating the premiums on
import licenses in both devaluations.
The Indian devaluation is another instructive case where time series on
premium-inclusive EERs are unfortunately not available.Bhagwati and
Srinivasan's sample data show a decline in the simple average of premiums from
226 percent to 81 percent. In contrast their estimates of premium-exclusive EERs
show bias virtually unchanged before and after the Indian devaluation. Ap-
parently, bias was significantly reduced by the Indian devaluation, and the main
mechanism forachievingthatreduction was theliberalizationof the
regime—that is, the reduction in the premium on import licenses.106 QR-RELATED ASPECTS OF PHASE II
It seems reasonable to conclude that nothing can be inferred about the
nature of change of bias in the trade and payments regime from inspection of
the premium-exclusive EERs. Despite the difficulty of obtaining data on
premiums, it is far better to use some data than to ignore the phenomenon
completely. As the data in Table 6-3 clearly show, the reduced size of
premiums on import licenses may be the most significant component of the
bias reduction that results from devaluation.
The second possible candidate for use as a proxy for premium-inclusive
EERs is the black market exchange rate relative to some indicator of other
rates. In theory, something can be said for use of such a rate. After all, what is
omitted from estimates of EER is the premium accruing to licenses, and it
might be expected that the ratio of the black market rate to the EER (or any
authorized rate) would increase as the restrictiveness of the regime increased.
The difficulty with this conjecture is largely empirical. The black market in
foreign exchange is, to a considerable extent, a market for currency, which is
heavily influenced by a variety of factors that differ widely from country to
country—the ease with which tourists can bring goods and foreign assets into
and out of the country; the degree to which the trade and payments regime
discriminates against consumer goods; the openness of the border; the ease
with which foreign assets can be accumulated through faked invoicing; and the
extent of smuggling. In one situation, tourists might be prohibited from carry-
ing currency with them in a regime that is very liberal about the importation of
most commodities, and in another one, tourism might be freely allowed while
imports of most capital and intermediate goods are heavily circumscribed,
with attendant high premiums on licenses. In the former case, one would ex-
pect the ratio of the black market rate to the relevant exchange rate to be
higher than in the latter case, even though most people would assert that the
latter regime was more restrictionist.
Therefore, as with premium-exclusive EERs, little can be said a priori, but
a comparison of the relationship of black market rates to official rates with
estimates of bias is of interest. This is done in Table 6-4. As anticipated, little
systematic relationship can be found. Even if one takes the estimate of the
premium by subtracting the premium-exclusive import EER from the
premium-inclusive one, no systematic relationship can be inferred.
It may be possible that, given knowledge about the particular cir-
cumstances, black market exchange rates can provide some information on in-
dividual countries. The Turkish data, for example, seem to conform to the
evidence available from other sources, indicating that the premium on foreign
exchange was virtually eliminated in the 1970 devaluation.30
Of some interest, also, is the fact that the ratio of the black market rate to
the official parity fell following all Phase III episodes. It is difficult, however,
to go beyond that statement. The impression that emerges, based on com-
parison of the bias estimates given in Table 6-2 with either premium-exclusive
EER ratios or wii
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EER ratios or with black market/official parity ratios is that there is no
satisfactory substitute for examining the behavior of both EERs and premiums
before and after Phase III episodes in order to obtain any indication at all of
the resource pulls that result from devaluation and liberalization. It is almost
certainly preferable to obtain estimates of premiums—even though very
rough—than to rely on proxy variables or to omit consideration of premiums
altogether.
Individual Country Experiences
The difficulty encountered in obtaining premium data led some of the country
authors to attempt other means of estimating the impact of on the
bias generated by the trade and payments regime. Those endeavors are of in-
terest not only because of the additional light they shed on the link between
devaluation, liberalization, and bias reduction, but also because they illustrate
methodologies that can be employed in attempting to estimate, the impact of
devaluation (and other measures) on import license premiums.
The Ghanaian gross devaluation of 1967 was 43 percent, and restrictions
prior to the devaluation were quite severe. Leith attempted to estimate the ex-
tent to which the devaluation was passed through to the domestic economy.
On the export side, he compared unit value statistics with domestic producer
prices. For some commodities the devaluation was more than reflected in
domestic prices, as taxes on exports were simultaneously removed. For others,
subject to the State Cocoa Marketing Board (which, despite its name, operates
in a number of primary-commodity markets), changes in the domestic pro-
ducer price of exportable commodities were delayed until the next growing
season.
When all these factors were taken into account, Leith found that the
average increase in domestic producer prices of exportables was less than a
percentage point greater than the devaluation; that is, the net devaluation was
on average equal to the gross for exports, and domestic pricesreflected the
full amount of the devaluation. To ascertain the effect on the domestic prices
of imports, Leith compared the domestic and international price of imports,
by individual items, in the periods before and after devaluation. He was
unable to obtain an estimate of these prices for intermediate and capital goods
imported for own use—less important in Ghana than in many other coun-
tries—so his estimate understates the degree to which the devaluation was
premium-absorbing. Despite that, Leith found' that about 55percentof the
gross devaluation was reflected in wholesale prices for commodities imported
for resale.3Thus, domestic prices of importables rose 23 percent, while
domestic prices of exportables rose 45percent,and the bias of the regime was















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0EERs in Table 6-3 further reinforces the view that devaluation operates to
reduce bias via premium absorption and that important relative price effects
result.
The second interesting experience is that of the Philippines. There, it will
be recalled, the intent was to replace QRs with tariff protection. Even in this
case, where it was intended that protection to domestic industry should be con-
tinued, bias of the regime fell substantially—an indication of the extent to
which devaluation is bias-reducing. Fortunately, premium-inclusive EER data
for the Philippines are available (see Table 6-2). Like Leith, Baldwin estimated
the discrepancy between the behavior of import EERs and the domestic prices
of the comparable commodities:
From 1959 to 1962, when the exchange rate per dollar including the margin fee
rose from P2.50 to P3.90, or by 56 percent, the wholesale price index of imported
products increased only 22 percent. If the rise in the dollar price of imports is
taken into account, the net rise in import prices associated with the increase in the
price of foreign exchange was only 15 percent.... Permittingunlimited imports
of most items at the same time that the currency was depreciated meant that these
windfall gains absorbed most of the price-increasing effects of the depreciation.32
Baldwin summed up the effects of the devaluation as follows:
What must have surprised government officials was the extent of the
economic difficulties that the import-substitution sector did face. They did not
seem to appreciate that, by providing the export sector with more favorable
trading terms and increasing the import costs of raw materials and capital goods,
resources would be pulled out of the new industrial sector even if the level of pro-
tection on final consumption goods was maintained. .
.
ThePhilippine intent to maintain an import-substitution strategy while
liberalizing the trade and payments regime points to a conclusion that emerges
fairly uniformly from the country studies: QR regimes tend to provide more
protection to import-substitution industries than is generally recognized and
intended. Liberalization, therefore, by reducing the premium on import
licenses, tends to reduce the bias of the trade and payments regime. Even when
tariffs replace preexisting quotas or import prohibitions, those tariffs tend to
provide lessprotection, perhaps for a variety of unintended reasons.
Michaely's description of the resistance of Israeli entrepreneurs to a shift from
QRs to tariffs for protective purposes provides further evidence along this line.
In general the evidence from the country studies is that bias reduction is
usually a major concomitant of net devaluation and that the reduction comes
about more through the absorption of preexisting premiums on import licenses
than by differential changes in export and import EERs. While liberalization
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may have effects of its own, it seems clear that a major part of its impact is
through the removal of premiums on import licenses and the consequent
reduction in bias of the regime.
IV. RATIONALIZATION OF THE REGIME
The term rationalization applies to all the measures employed to simplify pro-
cedures, remove inconsistencies, speed formalities, and otherwise reduce the
complexities and clumsiness of the QR system. Just as liberalization and bias
reduction interact, there is a close relationship between rationalization of the
regime and reduction in the extent of variance. To the extent that rationaliza-
tion consists of simplification of the regime, variance reduction inevitably
results. Just as liberalization—by absorbing premiums on import licenses—has
its greatest effect through reducing the bias of the regime, itis probably
through reduced variance that rationalization has its greatest impact. This ef-
fect of rationalization cannot be separately treated and is dealt with below in
considering the effect of the various devaluations on the variance of the trade
and payments regimes.
In addition to reducing variance, rationalization can have another effect
that, while difficult to quantify, may be important: in simplifying paperwork,
reducing delays, and otherwise streamlining procedures and implementation,
the deadweight costs of the QR regime may be substantially reduced. In the
sense of simplification of procedures, rationalization can take a number of
forms: (1) the number of steps involved in obtaining import licenses may be
reduced; (2) the paperwork necessary to obtain export subsidies may be
diminished; (3) delays associated with obtaining imports may be shortened or
eliminated; and (4) the effort required to obtain the necessary licenses and per-
mits may be cut substantially.
Effects of this type accompanied a large number of the devaluations
studied here. The Indian regime was rationalized and simplified by introducing
priority industries (which could obtain imports with vastly simplified pro-
cedures) and by replacing export subsidies, at least temporarily, with a
uniform exchange rate. After the Turkish devaluation of 1970 the import
licensing procedure for Quota List imports was altered so that the formalities
became annual, rather than semi-annual.
Reducing the amount of paperwork required for obtaining import licenses
(or export subsidies) can cut down the clerical staff required to enter interna-
tional transactions; it can thereby, inter alia, permit the entry of small firms
which might otherwise be precluded from engaging inforeign trade.
Simplification can also result in a reduction in the amount of entrepreneurial
time and resources devoted to the necessary formalities. To the extent that112 QR-RELATEDASPECTS OF PHASE U
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delays in obtaining imports are cut down, inefficiencies resulting from missing
spare parts, using inappropriate intermediate goods, and production stop-
pages can be eliminated. When restrictions requiring the purchase of imports
from particular sources (as under bilateral agreements) are removed, in-
dividual firms may face lower input prices, both because they can buy in the
cheapest market and because their bargaining power vis-a-vis suppliers is
increased.
It is difficult if not impossible to estimate the net benefits that can result
from simplification and rationalization of the regime, and no country author
tried to do so. There is little doubt that some deadweight losses are eliminated
and that the benefits of removing them may be substantial.
V. REDUCING VARIANCE
The theory of QR interaction with devaluation in the two-commodity case may
be generalized whenever the composite-commodity theorem can be invoked,
but not otherwise. Yet a reasonable hypothesis often put forward is that QR
regimes permit greater variance in the treatment accorded to various categories
of tradables than do liberalized regimes, and that the significant difference
between tariffs and QRs lies in the greater variation that occurs under QR
regimes.
A first step in analyzing this hypothesis is to trace the effect of devalua-
tion and concurrent, related policy measures on the variance of the different
trade and payments regimes. There are a number of ways in which devaluation
itself tends to reduce variance, and rationalization reinforces the trend.
Therefore, the effects of variance reduction cannot be estimated independently
of the other components of the move to Phase III. Here, the evidence about
the variance-reducing component of devaluation packages will be examined in
anticipation of later evaluating the impact of devaluation packages in their en-
tirety.
Rationalization resulting from the replacement of multiple procedures
and charges with a unified exchange rate may have important microeconomic
effects, but those effects are difficult to pinpoint and quantify. In contrast,
devaluation under QRs almost always results in reduced variance in the EER
for different categories of transactions because premiums for some com-
modities are invariably absorbed by the exchange rate change, and the replace-
ment of surcharges, guarantee deposits, and taxes diminishes the EER change
for others.. In most countries some categories of imports—usually termed
"essential"—were accorded favored treatment prior to devaluation, while
others—especially those that might threaten import-substitute industries, were
highly restricted. Almost always the exchange rate change served to increaseREDUCING VARIANCE
the EER on essential imports and partly or entirely to replace the preexisting
premium on import licenses for the others. The differential between these im-
port categories was in this way reduced.
Fishlow's account of the Brazilian experience aptly illustrates this point:
The Phase II reform initiated in [19531 which auctioned rather than awarded
licenses was successful only in progressively increasing the cost of imports encom-
passed in the regular auctions. It maintained a large proportion of subsidized im-
ports never part of the regular system, as the low ratio of the implicit average [im-
port] rate to the average general category [import) rate shows. And it continued
to discriminate increasingly against exports by adjusting the exchange rate infre-
quently and belatedly. *
Theestablishment of the tariff in [1957], and the effective elimination of
auctions by aggregating into a general category. .. seemeda step in the direction
of unification, and away from the auction multiple rate structure. In fact,
however, the policy was remarkably similar to the 1953 changes in its execution.
Import prices were again successfully increased to discourage purchases. But
simultaneously the quantity of imports admitted under special circumstances at
lower exchange rates dramatically increased.
A true Phase III liberalization occurred in March 1961. ...Itmaintained
and extended the focus on export profitability, but also definitively came to grips
with the favorable treatment of petroleum, wheat, and capital goods imports.
While the average general category imports did not rise in real cost, the effect of
the elimination of the subsidy was to increase the average price of imports as a
whole: wheat and petroleum represented about a quarter of total imports at this
time. .
.
Evenafter 1961, however, variance was still wide in Brazil. This can be
seen in Table 6-5,inwhich the effective rates of protection (ERP) on various
categories of commodities are given for 1963, after special subsidies for wheat
had been eliminated, and for 1966, after the next Phase III episode but before
the 1967 tariff reforms. Even after the massive variance reduction associated
with the 1961 Phase HI, the variance in effective protective rates accorded to
different industries in 1963 was huge—with an average ERP of 75 percent,
crops were subject to negative protection of minus 15 percent (contrasted with
an estimated minus 45 percent in 1958). By 1966, the average ERP had declin-
ed to 44 percent.35
Other country studies provide similar findings. Baldwin reports devalua-
tion "narrowing somewhat the differences in the degree of protection among
consumer goods, essential producer goods and essential consumer goods" in
the Philippines' 1960-1962 Phase Ill, despite the intent to maintain protection
by substituting tariffs for QRs.3'
In the Egyptian case the 23 percent gross devaluation was almost entirely
offset, leaving only a 3 percent net devaluation. It can therefore be taken as
113
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Table6-5.Brazilian Eftective Rates of Protection, before and after
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after
typifyingthe effects of the rationalization component of devaluation. Hansen
and Nashashibi conclude:
The devaluation of 1962, followed by strongly expansionary domestic demand
policies over the next two years, was doomed to be an empty gesture. To some ex-
tentitcodified earlier de factor devaluation undertaken via the exchange
—13 premium system introduced in 1957, but the unification of the exchange rates was
16 a decisively new feature which by itself removed some of the protection enjoyed
24 earlier by some industries highly dependent upon imported raw materials."
72 Michaely believes that reduced variance was an important result of the
30 gross component of the 1962 Israeli devaluation. He calculated the coefficient
of variation in import EERs, and found that it fell from 0.43 5 before devalua-
112 tion to 0.268 afterward.38
103 In India a major motive for the devaluation episode appears to have been
120 recognition that the piecemeal incentives of Phase IIwere inefficient;
251 Bhagwati and Srinivasan reported:
The fact that a major impulse behind the devaluation was the growing realization
that the export subsidies and tariffs were only an inadequate and inefficient
56 substitute for the formal parity change that was called for, meant that the govern-
1 ment desired the devaluation primarily to substitute for existing measures. Hence
332 the degree of the devaluation was to reflect mainly the existing levels of export
232 subsidization and only partially to go beyond that."
321
183 In evaluating export peformance following the 1966 Indian devaluation,
299 Bhagwati and Srinivasan conclude that a factor of major significance was that
incentives for a wide variety of exports were not materially altered, although
142 export subsidies were quickly reintroduced.
158 The same sort of variance reduction among export EERs happened
elsewhere. In most countries, selected export commodites—"new," or "non-
traditional," or "manufactured," or "minor"—were usually granted larger
i 966 EERs prior to Phase III than were other export categories. In Ghana the ratio
— ofthe cocoa EER to the EER for other exports rose from 0.60 in 1966, prior to
devaluation, to 0.72 in 1967, after devaluation.40 In the Turkish devaluation of
154 1958 the export EER was likewise unified.
539 The country studies provide sufficient evidence to conclude that devalua-
230 tion from a QR-dominated situation results in a substantial reduction in
68 discrimination among commodity categories. Such a conclusion does not une-
69 quivocally confirm the notion that QR regimes have higher variance in the im-
plicit protection accorded to different commodity categories than do liberaliz-
ed regimes. Examination of that hypothesis would require a great deal of addi-116 QR-RELATED ASPECTS OF PHASE II
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tional research to insure that (premium-inclusive) EERs were measured for
Phases II and IV on a comparable basis. It is sufficient to indicate that the
results of devaluation and the measures that accompany it will include the
resource reallocation and other effects of reduced variance. As with liberaliza-
tion, bias reduction, and rationalization, these effects are bound to result from
a Phase III episode. Analysis of the consequences of Phase III devaluations
must, therefore, take into account the effects of all those interrelated
phenomena as well as the conventional macroeconomic considerations that
follow exchange rate changes under currency convertibility.
NOTES
1. See the list of Symbols under Definitionsinthe first section of Chapter 5.
2. A difficulty arises with this definition whenever QRs are prohibitive, as the value of trade
would be zero. It is not obvious how this particular difficulty can be overcome.
3. Turkey and Brazil, among the countries included in the project, licensed exports of
various commodities at one time or another in an attempt to keep domestic prices of some export
commodities low.
4. If there were a premium on export licenses, the ad valorem premium would have to be
subtracted from the denominator of Equation (6.2). Obviously it would not make sense to sub-
sidize exports and restrict them by licensing.
5. Other measures are possible. Hansen and Nashashibi, for example, used n,+I,— r, — s,.
Withmany commodities, of course, weights must be employed.
6. With monopoly power in trade, B should be redefined to be the divergence of domestic
prices from those that would prevail with an optimal tariff (that is, the divergence of the domestic
marginal rate of transformation from the international marginal rate of transformation).
7. Strictly speaking, the estimate of bias should be derived from those commodities that are
domestically produced, or would be produced under free trade, since those are the ones affected
by the incentives created by the trade and payments regime. Tariffs and premiums on imported
commodities not domestically produced do not directly affect resource allocation between produc-
tion of exportables and import substitutes. However, the costs of obtaining import licenses and the
higher prices of imports that are inputs to other activities may be highly significant determinants
of resource allocation.
8. When there are transactions other than for imports and exports, resource misallocation
would nonetheless occur, but focus here is on the simple two-commodity situation.
9. The diagram is not useful for examining the macroeconomic implications of devaluation.
It is, nonetheless, satisfactory for representing the QR-related aspects of devaluation.
10. Again, the partial equilibrium nature of the presentation should be noted—consumption
of something else must rise and domestic resources must flow from someother industry as the
price of foreign exchange increases.
11. There could, of course, be quantitative restrictions upon exports, but that would com-
plicate the analysis without adding anything essential. Note also that one might in principle draw a
general-equilibrium demand and supply schedule in the context of a model with home goods, but
the resulting schedules would never be valid in the case where tariffs and quotas were imposed at
differential rates on imports and exports.12. Even here, different possible impacts on bias are evident: if the deficit were made up en-
tirely by increasing the export EER, leaving imports (and therefore their domestic price) unaltered,
bias would be reduced by the devaluation. If, instead, the deficit were eliminated by decreasing im-
ports, bias of the regime would be increased.
13. Depressing income may also increase export supplies and thus permit further increases in
the quantity of imports.
14. Fishlow summary, p. 71.
15. See the discussion in the second section of Chapter 9 and Table 9-8 for more detail.
16. Exports were also subject to licensing, but open licensing was the rule throughout the
1960s.
17. Leith, p. 23.
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18. Ibid., pp. 140-41.
19. Ibid., p. 142.
20. Bhagwati and Srinivasan, p. 84.
21. Data are from ibid., Table 11-1.
22. The Indian recession is discussed in Chapter 8, below. By 1969, economic activity was ex-
panding, and India was again in Phase II.
23. Michaely, pp. 178-79.
24. Ibid., p. 59.
25. Private foreign capital flows were also a significant factor enabling import liberalization
to continue after the reforms of 1964 and 1965.
26. The 1970 Turkish devaluation also appears to have eliminated most premiums on import
licenses, at least for the period immediately following devaluation. In that case, however, the
devaluation itself carried almost the entire burden of liberalization, and few other policies were
undertaken; monetary and fiscal policies were expansionary, the flow of imports increased only in
response to increased foreign exchange receipts, and no substantial changes were made in the ex-
change control regulations governing foreign trade.
27. When intermediate goods are present, the usual qualifications to the above statement
would have to be made. The relevant unit of observation for traded goods is then a unit of
(foreign-currency) value added.
28. It might, of course, happen that the premium-exclusive data were perfectly correlated
with premium-inclusive estimates or that the direction of change in the two series was always the
same. In some particular circumstances, such an inference can be drawn, but it is extremely inap-
propriate when considering devaluation.
29. Tariff redundancy occurs when the domestic price is below the international price times
one plus the tariff. In that case the economically relevant tariff is defined by the price ratio.
30. The black market rate after the 1958/59 Turkish devaluation is identical to the tourist ex-
change rate that went into effect that year.
31. These estimates and the discussion are drawn from Leith, pp. 116-22.
32. Baldwin, p. 58.
33. Ibid., p. 62.
34. Fishlow summary, pp. 68-69.
35. Variance and standard deviations in Table 6-5 were calculated from Fishlow's data
without applying weights. Fishlow's mean estimates are clearly weighted. If weights were used for
variance, there would still be a decline; whether it would be greater or smaller is in the
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36. Baldwin, p. 58. Chapter7
37. Hansen and Nashashibi, pp.90-91.
38. Michaely, pp. 59-61.
39. Bhagwati and Srinivasan, p. 83. Italics arein the original.
40. Leith, Table 11-9. Both export EERs roserelative to the import EER, of course, but that
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